Epistemic Subjects Beyond Individuals

Traditionally, epistemologists have investigated the nature of epistemic properties (e.g. knowledge, belief and understanding) on the assumption that they apply to human individuals and to human individuals only. Meanwhile technology and social collaboration are playing an increasingly large role in scientific practice, and our conceptual tools are lagging behind in taking this into account. Recent discussions in social epistemology have taken seriously the question whether epistemic properties may be suitably attributed (to a lesser or equal extent) to entities other than human individuals, such as groups (collective epistemology), artefacts (android epistemology) or individuals in conjunction with “external” components (extended epistemology). Developments in other fields (e.g. work in cognitive science on distributed, artificial and extended cognition respectively) seem to support an affirmative answer and provide useful perspectives for (social) epistemology and philosophy of science to account for epistemic practices beyond the individual. So far these developments have only to a very limited extent influenced the epistemology literature.

It is time to take a closer look at the “epistemic subject” as an explanatory concept and how it may fare in explaining entities beyond individuals. Therefore this international workshop focuses on the possibility of attributing understanding, knowledge or beliefs to collective, extended or artificial subjects as well as how to conceptualise them.